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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines a set of investment strategies based on past market information to evaluate 
performance and trading impact on the Canadian Market
1
. In doing so, we assess whether trading 
information adds value to the effectiveness of these strategies. Utilizing variant models of four 
different methodologies, we find strong evidence that supported the Momentum Investment Strategy, 
which buys past winner stocks and sells past loser stocks. Our evidence did not support Contrarian 
Investment Strategy, which posits that investors overreact to good and bad news. Our winners’ 
portfolios outperform our losers’ portfolios.  The Negative Volume Effect Strategy did not work, 
which is contrary to the Foerster, Prihar and Schmitz (1995) study. We found that winners’ stocks 
did not reverse in cases of heavy volume; nor did loser stocks reverse in a high volume context. 
However, we did find that trading information has an impact on stock returns and thus adds value to 
investment strategies for the 1990 to 2000 investment period.  Investors who combine past price and 
trading volume information in constructing their investment strategies would achieve higher returns 
than investors who base their portfolio construction decisions solely on stock prices. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ince the dawn of modern finance, there has been a long debate and research on whether historical data on 
stocks is useful information in forecasting stock price changes. According to the weak form of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis, it is impossible to forecast market direction based on past data. Nevertheless, 
many researchers, DeBondt and Thaler (1985), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Assogbavi, Khoury, and Yourougou 
(1995) Baytas and Nusret (1999), Dirk, DeBondt and Weber (1999), Mun, Vasconcellos, and Kish (2000), have 
challenged this hypothesis by showing that investors can achieve abnormal returns using investment strategies based 
on past market data such as price and trading volume. Recent findings by Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), and 
Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001), on investment strategies based on historical data tend to confirm that past 
stock price and trading volume provide valuable information in predicting market direction and stock returns.  
Accordingly, practitioners should consider using past market information in constructing investment portfolios. 
However, depending on the strategy, the methodology utilized may seem at times to be contradictory.  For instance, 
while contrarian investment strategies recommend buying past losers and selling past winners, momentum strategies 
recommend buying past winners and selling past losers. From a practitioner standpoint, knowing which of these 
investment strategies to apply becomes very challenging.   The main objective of this paper, is to investigate different 
strategies based upon previous studies such as those by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, contrarian), Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993, momentum), Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994, negative volume effect), and Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin 
(2001, positive volume effect), as well as to provide a better understanding of utilizing these strategies on the 
Canadian stock market using the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 100. Additionally, the extent to which trading 
information adds value to the robustness of these investment strategies is assessed.  
 
                                                 
1 The authors acknowledge research support from CISRO Institute of Management at Laurentian University. 
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The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II presents a brief review of the literature; in Section III the 
data and methodologies are described; Section IV summarizes results and Section V indicates our conclusions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There are many published studies on contrarian/momentum investment strategies.  The earliest and most 
influential work on contrarian investment strategy was done by DeBondt and Thaler (1985), who found that when 
U.S. stocks were ranked on their returns over the past three to five years, those with the lowest past returns earn higher 
returns over the subsequent three to five years, and vice versa. Baytas and Nusret (1999) reported that long-term 
contrarian strategies in the other seven industrialized countries seem to have significant returns. Dirk, DeBondt and 
Weber (1999) found that contrarian strategies in Germany appear to be profitable. Mun, Vasconcellos, and Kish 
(2000) tested contrarian strategies in the U.S. and Canadian markets over the period of 1986 to 1996. Their results 
also show that the contrarian returns in this period were less significant in Canada than in the U.S.    
 
As far as momentum investment strategy is concerned, one of the earliest  studies done by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) on the NYSE and the AMEX reported that a momentum strategy that buys the last 12 month top 
performer stocks and keeps them for just 3 months can earn as much as 1.49% per month. Cleary and Inglis (1998) 
also support the momentum strategy with a study based on Canadian common stocks during the period of 1978-1990. 
Rouwenhorst (1998) shows that momentum strategies worked in twelve European countries. Rouwenhorst (1999) also 
reported also emerging market stocks exhibited momentum. Dirk, De Bondt, and Weber (1999) reported that 
momentum and contrarian strategies appeared to beat a passive approach that invested in the market index of all major 
companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange of Germany for the 1961-1991 period. Chan, Hameed, and Tong 
(2000) showed statistically significant evidence of momentum profits derived from international stock market indices. 
Assogbavi and Dodge (2002) found that a momentum strategy that invested in medium-horizon “Winners” and sold 
past “Losers” gained approximately 2 percent per month in the Nigeria Stock Exchange.   
 
With respect to trading volume, Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) suggested that the first-order daily 
return autocorrelation tended to decline with volume. Blume, Easley, and O’Hara (1994) indicated that volume 
provided insights about information quality which could not be deduced from price statistics. Conrad, Hameed, and 
Niden (1994) presented strong evidence of a relationship between trading activity and subsequent autocovariances in 
weekly returns. Specifically, high-transaction securities experienced price reversal, while the returns of low-
transaction securities were positively autocovarying. Assogbavi, Khoury, and Yourougou (1995) confirmed an 
asymmetry in the price-volume relationship in equity markets using Canadian data. Datar, Vinay, Naik and Radcliffe 
(1998) pointed out that low turnover stocks generally earn higher returns than high turnover stocks. Chordia and 
Swaminathan (2000) reported that daily and weekly returns on high volume portfolios led returns on low volume 
portfolios because returns on low volume portfolios responded more slowly to information about market returns. Lee 
and Swaminathan (2000) asserted that firms with high (low) past turnover ratios earn lower (higher) future returns, 
and have consistently more negative (positive) earnings surprises over next eight quarters. Price momentum effects 
reverse over the next five years, and high (low) volume winners (losers) experience faster reversals. Gervais, Kaniel 
and Mingelgrin (2001) suggested that stocks experiencing unusually high (low) trading volume over a day or a week 
tended to appreciate (depreciate) over the course of the following month. The common ground of all of these studies is 
that past information is invaluable for predicting future market trends and individual stock returns. The purpose of this 
study is to analyze the performance of a set of investment strategies based upon past market information, from the 
Canadian stock market (the TSE). In doing so, the importance of trading information in these investment strategies for 
the investment period of 1990 to 2000 is established.  
 
DATA AND METODOLOGY 
 
Data Description 
 
The data used in this study consists of daily trading volumes and prices from January 1990 to February 2000 
on 100 stocks that made up the TSE 100 index. The TSE 100 Index includes 100 of the largest and most liquid stocks 
traded on the TSE.  It represents two-thirds of the capitalization of the Canadian equity market. The TSE is the 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – September 2005                                 Volume 4, Number 9 
 29 
Canada's premier market for senior equities, accounting for approximately 95% of all equity trading in Canada. In 
2000, more than 40 billion shares valued at $944 billion were traded.  
 
Methodology 
 
For comparison purposes, the methodologies used in this paper to evaluate the performance of 
contrarian/momentum investment strategies are adapted from previous articles on similar subjects with minor 
modifications.  Specifically, our methodologies are based on four different articles; DeBondt and Thaler (1985) for the 
Contrarian strategy; Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for the Momentum strategy; Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994) for 
the Negative volume effect; and Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) for the Positive volume effect.  In these four 
analyses, the original ideas and approaches are followed as closely as possible. 
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
Contrarian Strategy 
 
The Contrarian Strategy is related to the overreaction hypothesis which assumes that most people tend to 
“overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. Some economists such as Basu (1977) and Dreman (1982) 
believe that the same behavior occurs in stock markets.  In other words, they think that stock prices are overvalued in 
case of good news and undervalued in case of bad news, but eventually return to more appropriate, less inflated or less 
deflated values.  Based on this hypothesis, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) designed an empirical test due to the fact that: 
(1) Extreme movements in stock prices will be followed by subsequent price movements in the opposite direction. (2) 
The more extreme the initial price movement, the greater will be the subsequent adjustment.  We follow DeBondt and 
Thaler’s (1985) empirical test design that bought past losers and sold past winners.  Our empirical test results, after 
correcting for missing data problems and for the time frame of this study, are presented in Table I.  
 
Winner portfolios were composed of top 10% stocks in terms of returns in formation periods. Loser 
portfolios were composed of bottom 10% stocks in terms of returns in formation periods. The returns of winner 
portfolios and loser portfolios were calculated over three year holding periods following a three year formation period. 
Average annual return is calculated by dividing Average Return for three years of the  holding period by three.  
 
For every stock j, starting in December 1992 (month 36; the "portfolio formation date", we compute the 
cumulative returns Rjt for the prior 36 months or three-year period (the "portfolio formation" period, months 1 through 
36). Rjt is calculated as below;  
 
 
where Rjt = cumulative return in a given stock j for the t
th
 formation period of three-year duration starting in January 
1990; PjtF = the price of a given stock j on the first day of the t
th
 formation period;  PjtL = the price of a given stock j on 
the last day of the t
th
 formation period. 
 
Then we rank the top decile as the winner portfolio and the bottom decile as the loser portfolio. The 
portfolios are then formed based on the ranking prior to t = 0, the portfolio formation date.  For both winner and loser 
portfolios in the subsequent three-year test period (month 37 through month 72), we compute the cumulative average 
returns of all securities in the portfolio. Similar computation is done for subsequent periods ending in December 1993, 
1994, 1995, and 1996.  In Panel A, X is the annual average return (in percent) of portfolios, and Sx is the sample 
standard deviation in percentage terms. Panel B shows the annual return for winner and loser portfolios for five 
overlapping periods. 
 
jtF
jtFjtL
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Table I.   Summary Statistics of Performance of Contrarian Strategy2 
Panel A: Overall Sample Average Returns and Standard Deviations in percentages 
 X Sx Min Max t-statistic 
Winner 66.72 45.40 34.08 141.94 3.29 
Loser 40.12 14.15 23.44 58.62 6.34 
 
Panel B: Return for five overlapping periods in percentages 
Formation period Test period Winner Loser 
1990-1992 1993-1995 43.01 23.44 
1991-1993 1994-1996 34.08 30.09 
1992-1994 1995-1997 77.06 39.46 
1993-1995 1996-1998 37.51 58.62 
1994-1996 1997-1999 141.94 49.01 
 
 
In total, we generate five test results with overlapping periods. Our findings presented on Table I indicate that 
the returns of winner portfolios are higher than those of loser portfolios except for the test period of 1996 to 1998. On 
average, for the periods of 1993 to 1999, winner portfolios achieved 66.72 % annual return (t-statistic = 3.29) and 
loser portfolios achieved 40.12 % annual return (t-statistic = 6.34). Both values are statistically significant. Therefore, 
it seems that contrarian strategy did not work for 1990s’ TSE 100 stocks counter to the belief that loser portfolios are 
supposed to outperform winner portfolios according to the overreaction hypothesis or contrarian strategy.   A possible 
explanation of the failure of contrarian strategy may be related to the fact that Canadian stock market was a bull 
market in the 1990’s. Average annual market return for TSE 100 between 1993 and 1999 was 24.79 %.  However, 
loser portfolios still outperformed the market return by over 15%. Therefore, one cannot say contrarian strategy totally 
failed for this period. 
 
Momentum Strategy (Or Relative Strength Strategy) 
 
The momentum investment strategy is based on the assumption that stocks under-react to arrival of new 
information as opposed to the contrarian strategy.  It suggests that one buy past winners and sell past losers. The 
approach used in this study is a variant of what Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) used in their study. Our empirical test 
results are presented in Table II. The results correct for missing data and the time frame. 
 
For every stock j, starting in December 1990 (month 12; the "portfolio formation date"), we compute the 
cumulative returns Rjt for the prior 12 months or one-year period (the "portfolio formation" period, months 1 through 
12).  Divergent to the contrarian, the momentum strategy buys the winners (top decile portfolio) and sells the losers 
(bottom decile portfolio). Next, the return for each portfolio in the subsequent one-quarter test period (month 13 
through month 15) is computed. The process is then repeated throughout December 1999 to generate 12-month 
formation and 3-month holding period momentum portfolio.  Winner portfolios were composed of top 10% stocks in 
terms of returns during formation periods of one year. Loser portfolios were composed of bottom 10% stocks in terms 
of returns during formation periods of one year. The returns of winner portfolios and loser portfolios were calculated 
over subsequent three months or a quarter of holding periods. 
 
The annual return for each year was compounded from quarterly returns using the following equation:  
 
Annual Return = ((1+Q1/100)*(1+Q2/100)*(1+Q3/100)*(1+Q4/100)-1)*100  
 
Table II below presents our major findings.  In Panel A, X is the annual average return (in percent) for each 
portfolio, and Sx is the sample standard deviation in percentage terms. Panel B shows returns for loser and winner 
portfolio for each year.  
 
                                                 
2 The “C” computer program developed to generate these results is available from the authors on request. 
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 The results are quite consistent with what Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reported for U.S. market and what 
Foerster et al (1995) did with the Canadian market for 1977 to 1992.  For the quarterly returns, winner portfolios 
outperformed loser portfolios 27 quarters out of 36 quarters for the nine-year period between 1991 and 1999. Winners 
showed a 75 % winning rate over losers. For the annual returns, winner portfolios always outperformed loser 
portfolios for the same period. 
 
 
Table II.  Summary Statistics of returns of Momentum Strategy in percent 
Panel A: Overall Sample Average in percentages 
 X Sx Min Max t-statistic 
Winner 77.36 43.618 7.15 142.52 5.321 
Loser 16.79 23.660 -21.69 49.50 2.129 
Panel B: Return for nine periods in percentages 
Year Portfolio 
Quarterly Return Annual 
Return 
Market 
Return Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
1991 
Winner 25.96 12.27 18.83 10.91 86.38 
24.85 
Loser 52.17 -4.90 -0.91 -11.32 27.16 
1992 
Winner 46.05 -5.67 6.65 27.08 86.72 
10.56 
Loser 5.51 6.71 -8.39 8.41 11.82 
1993 
Winner 31.75 43.94 28.11 -8.71 121.79 
45.60 
Loser 7.26 -0.46 -1.29 19.67 26.12 
1994 
Winner 10.57 -19.72 16.76 3.38 7.15 
0.29 
Loser 1.55 -11.33 7.98 -1.25 -3.99 
1995 
Winner 11.99 13.79 17.78 34.23 101.47 
31.41 
Loser 14.30 14.83 3.38 10.18 49.50 
1996 
Winner 8.03 15.89 11.20 4.94 46.10 
37.91 
Loser 5.63 6.09 -1.48 22.02 34.72 
1997 
Winner 9.19 33.87 25.18 -4.27 75.17 
29.89 
Loser 0.04 2.66 5.06 -14.66 -7.92 
1998 
Winner 30.96 1.59 -19.30 20.15 29.00 
4.24 
Loser 9.92 -15.49 -14.63 -1.25 -21.69 
1999 
Winner 38.40 13.50 13.17 36.42 142.52 
24.19 
Loser 9.27 9.43 15.03 -1.59 35.36 
The average annual return of winner portfolios is 77.36 % (significant at t = 5.321), which outperforms that of the 
loser portfolios, 16.79 % (significant at t = 2.129) and the market 23.22 %. The performance of this strategy is quite 
substantial from 1990 to 2000, which was a boom period for the Canadian market. 
 
 
Positive Volume Effect Strategy (High Volume Return Premium) 
 
This strategy uses trading volume as an exclusive predictor of future prices. Using this approach, Gervais, 
Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) reported that individual stocks whose trading activity is unusually large (small) over 
periods of a day or a week, as measured by trading volume during those periods, tend to experience large (small) 
returns over the subsequent month. They postulated that this result is due to shocks in trader interest in a given stock, 
that is, the stock’s visibility. Following Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), we construct our methodology and 
conduct our analysis as follows. First, we construct our sample by splitting the period between January 1990 to 
December 1999 into 51 nonintersecting trading intervals of 50 trading days. The first interval is used only for 
formation and reference purpose. Each formation period of 50-days trading interval is split into a reference period and 
a formation date, which, respectively, consists of the first 49 days and the last day of the interval. The number of 
shares traded is used as the measure of trading volume. For a given formation period, a stock is classified as a high- 
(low-) volume stock if its formation date volume is among the top 10 percent (bottom 10 percent) of 50 daily trading 
volumes. Otherwise, it is classified as a normal volume stock.  At the formation date, we form high- (low) volume 
portfolios based on the stock's trading volume classification.  After the portfolios are formed, they are held without 
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any rebalancing over the next 50-days trading interval which is the holding or the test period
3
.   The average returns 
for both portfolios in a given test period, Xp is computed as below; 
 
 
Where Np = the number of stocks in the high volume portfolio (p = H) or the low volume portfolio (p = L);  P jF = the 
price of a given stock j on the first day of the test period in the high volume portfolio or the low volume portfolio;  PjL 
= the price of a given stock j on the Last day of the test period in the high volume portfolio or the low volume 
portfolio. The periodic returns of high portfolios and low portfolios were calculated over subsequent holding period of 
50 trading days.  
 
The annual return for each year was compounded from periodic returns using the following equation;   
 
Annual Return = ((1+P1/100)*(1+P2/100)*(1+P3/100)*(1+P4/100)*(1+P5/100)-1)*100  
 
The findings are presented in Table III below.  In Panel A, X is the annual average return (in percent) of each 
portfolio, and Sx is the sample standard deviation in percentage terms. Panel B shows returns for High and Low 
portfolio for each year. 
 
Our results in Table III  show that the periods of extremely high volume tend to be followed by positive 
excess returns, while periods of extremely low volume tend to be followed by even larger positive excess returns in 
1990 – 2000 periods for TSE 100 stocks.  The average annual return for high volume stocks, 24.27% (significant at t = 
3.087) is higher than the market return of 19.69 % but the average annual return for low volume stocks, 35.83 % 
(significant at t = 3.236) is even higher than that of high volume stocks. For the investment periods considered, high 
volume stocks outperform low volume stocks only in 24 periods out of total 50 periods tested. For individual years, 
the results of only two years, 1990 and 1992, were consistent with the findings of Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin 
(2001) on the NYSE that show that high volume tend to be followed by positive excess returns, whereas periods of 
low volume tend to be followed by negative excess returns.  However, an interesting point is that average annual 
return of high volume stocks, 24.27 % is still higher than that of the market, 19.69 %.  
 
Negative Volume Effect 
 
One important implication of the paper of Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) is that “price change 
accompanied by high volume tend to be reversed; this will be less true of price changes on days with low volume.” 
Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994) tried to test for this relation between lagged volume and price suggested by 
Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) using a strategy varied from what Lehmann (1990) proposed. Following 
Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994), the methodology used in this analysis is as follows.  For each week (week t), we 
calculate uit-1, the measure of abnormal trading in security i at week t-1 or previous week as follow: 
 
uit-1 = (Vit-1 – V it-2) / Vit-2 
 
where Vit-1 and Vit-2 are the sums of the trading volumes in security i for week t-1 and t-2, respectively. A positive uit-1 
is considered a positive trading shock or high-transaction security; a negative uit-1 is taken as a negative trading shock 
or low-transaction security
4
. For each week (week t), we calculate Rit-1, the return of security i (in percent) at week t-1  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) report that at a horizon of 50 to 100 days the profits seem to level off or even decline. In 
addition, the profits of shorter trading days does not warrant transaction fee. 
4
 We use the volume as a measure of trading in the security even though Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994) use the number of 
transaction, for they suggest that, using their method, volume and the number of transactions measure are roughly the same. 
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Table III. Summary Statistics of  Returns of Positive Volume Effect Strategy in percent 
Panel A: Overall Sample Average in percentages 
 X Sx Min Max t-statistic 
High 24.27 24.86 -12.04 67.77 3.087 
Low 35.83 35.02 -7.80 112.99 3.236 
Panel B : Return for  nine period in percentages 
Year Portfolio 
Periodic Returns 
Annual Return 
Market 
Return Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
1990 
high -1.11 3.19 -7.00 12.77 17.66 25.92 
-12.02 
low -1.43 -2.98 -19.84 7.50 11.88 -7.80 
1991 
high -2.89 0.48 -4.40 -3.04 20.96 9.40 
24.85 
low 0.00 2.22 -2.63 2.53 13.54 15.87 
1992 
high 1.23 6.75 0.36 6.83 13.24 31.20 
10.56 
low -2.88 2.34 -3.95 8.84 -1.29 2.57 
1993 
high 25.65 8.20 1.16 6.54 14.50 67.77 
45.60 
low 9.70 44.87 7.83 15.79 7.34 112.99 
1994 
high -9.57 -5.97 6.88 -4.46 4.02 -9.68 
0.29 
low -5.03 -9.14 11.16 3.12 15.85 14.59 
1995 
high 6.96 3.40 0.38 -0.64 11.06 22.51 
31.41 
low 0.00 14.20 1.54 5.65 2.53 25.61 
1996 
high 5.64 4.79 6.39 2.03 2.09 22.68 
37.91 
low 5.96 3.70 6.09 14.74 -1.03 32.38 
1997 
high -1.48 10.14 3.86 12.97 2.93 31.05 
29.89 
low 21.23 13.84 -0.51 3.25 9.09 54.65 
1998 
high 6.39 5.98 -12.46 -10.00 -0.98 -12.04 
4.24 
low 27.04 5.08 -15.60 -6.25 38.52 46.31 
1999 
high 32.96 8.03 -0.52 -3.14 11.17 53.86 
24.19 
low 1.58 11.71 6.75 26.67 5.02 61.14 
 
 
or previous week as follow; 
 
Rit-1 = (Pit-1 – Pit-2 ) / Pit-2  100 
 
where Pit-1 and Pit-2 are the weekly average prices in security i for week t-1 and t-2, respectively.  
We then combine the returns and trading activities to form four portfolios for week t. These portfolios are formed by 
classifying securities based on the returns and trading activities of previous week (week t-1). At the end of each week 
(week t), securities are classified into Winners (Rit-1 > 0) or Losers (Rit-1 < 0) and High or Low transaction (uit-1 > 0 or 
uit-1  < 0).  The weights in each of the four portfolios (WH, WL, LH, and LL) for week t are: 
 
where Np is the number of securities in each particular portfolio.  
 
The portfolio mean return for each week (week t), is calculated as below;  
 
The formation of portfolios were based on the past returns (W or L, respectively Winner or Loser) and past 
trading activities (H or L, respectively High or Low) of stocks in the formation period of a week. In Panel A, X is the 
annual average return (in percent) of each portfolio, and Sx is the sample standard deviation in percentage terms. 
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Panel B shows returns for each portfolio in each of nine years. Weekly return for each year is the average weekly 
return for the year. Annual return for each year is compounded from weekly return using the following equations; 
 
Annual Return = (Weekly Return/100+1)**52*100-100 
 
The results of our analysis appear in Table IV below.  Our findings are partly consistent with Conrad, 
Hameed, and Niden (1994) who demonstrated that high-transaction securities experience price reversals whereas low 
transactions securities experience price continuation using NASDAQ and NMS data.  In this study, winners keep 
winning and losers keep losing regardless of trading volumes.  In other words, our results show price continuation 
without regard to transaction levels. On the contrary, in the study of Conrad et al. (1994), the price continuation occurs 
only with low transaction securities. That is, low transaction winners keep winning and low transaction losers keep 
losing but high transaction winners experience losing and high transaction losers experience winning. However, in our 
study, winners with high transaction always outperformed winners with low transaction and losers with high 
transaction most of time are out performed by losers with low transaction. Therefore, trading information on the TSE 
100 still appears to be an important predictor of the returns of individual securities.  
 
 
Table IV. Summary Statistics of Returns of Negative Volume Effect Strategy 
Panel A: Overall Sample Average in percentages 
 X Sx Min Max t-stat 
W,H 175.37 55.03 69.27 253.27 10.077 
W,L 60.29 33.23 4.78 104.94 5.737 
L,H -28.31 16.32 -46.28 -0.66 -5.487 
L,L -12.15 21.69 -50.54 19.76 -1.771 
Panel B: Return for each year in percentages 
Year Period 
Returns of Portfolios 
Market Return 
W,H W,L L,H L,L 
1990 
Weekly 1.02 0.28 -1.19 -1.34  
Annual 69.27 15.50 -46.28 -50.54 -12.02 
1991 
Weekly 2.46 1.17 -0.83 -0.41  
Annual 253.27 82.83 -35.12 -19.03 24.85 
1992 
Weekly 1.77 0.66 -0.52 -0.50  
Annual 148.89 41.04 -23.58 -23.01 10.56 
1993 
Weekly 2.27 1.39 -0.39 0.14  
Annual 220.98 104.94 -18.46 7.71 45.60 
1994 
Weekly 1.43 0.09 -0.64 -0.85  
Annual 109.62 4.78 -28.51 -35.95 0.29 
1995 
Weekly 1.98 1.08 -0.01 0.35  
Annual 176.65 74.44 -0.66 19.76 31.41 
1996 
Weekly 1.87 0.78 -0.10 0.08  
Annual 162.32 49.62 -4.83 4.05 37.91 
1997 
Weekly 2.16 1.24 -0.90 -0.05  
Annual 204.14 89.71 -37.37 -2.77 29.89 
1998 
Weekly 2.22 0.82 -1.18 -0.48  
Annual 213.08 52.53 -46.01 -22.33 4.24 
1999 
Weekly 2.11 1.22 -1.05 0.01  
Annual 195.45 87.48 -42.32 0.64 24.19 
 
 
For the annual and weekly returns of the four portfolios for the period between 1990 and 1999 shown in 
Table IV, winner portfolios always continued to win and always outperformed market returns whether they were high 
transaction or low transaction. However, high transactions always outperformed low transactions with significant 
differences. So, we conclude that information on trading activities appears to be an important factor in the TSE 100. 
For loser portfolios, we observe something similar. Most of the time losers continued to lose or their profits were 
significantly lower than market returns, if any. So, losers were always outperformed by market returns.   As far as the 
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average annual returns, WH (winners with high transaction) portfolios and WL (winners with low transaction) 
portfolios achieved an astonishing return of 175.37 % per year (significant at t = 10.077) and “moderate”-but-“still-
significant” returns of 60.29 % per year (significant at t = 5.737), respectively. If we see losers, both LH (losers with 
high transaction) portfolios and LL (losers with low transaction) portfolios suffered the negative earnings of –28.31 % 
(significant at t = -5.487) and –12.15 % per year (not significant at t = -1.771), respectively.  This finding is somewhat 
consistent with that of momentum strategy that buys past winners and sells past losers. As in momentum strategy, past 
winners continued to win and past losers continued to lose in a subsequent period. However, in this strategy past 
trading information combined with past returns seems to generate even more returns than the momentum strategy 
does. 
 
The negative aspect of this strategy is the frequent portfolio rebalancing activities and accompanying 
increase in transaction costs. In this strategy, the portfolio is rebalanced every week. Therefore, accumulated 
transaction cost can be significant. These days however, due to the presence of discount dealers and steep competition 
in the transaction market, it is possible for even a nonprofessional to keep transaction cost down to less than 1% a 
week with a moderate amount of investment.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study attempts to produce a better understanding of investment strategies based on past market 
information.  It shows that aside form the momentum strategy that buys past winners and sells past losers, no other 
investment strategy investigated is consistent with findings in the U.S. market using the same strategies. While the 
Negative Volume Effect shows the importance of trading volume in constructing investment portfolios, our findings 
on the impact of such volume information are quite different from those documented by Conrad, Hameed and Niden 
(1994) in the U.S..   While Conrad et al. (1994) show that high-volume stocks experience price reversal whereas low 
volume stocks experience price continuation, this study shows a presence of price continuation for both low and high 
volume and that high volume winners always outperform low volume winners and low volume losers outperform high 
volume losers. The main conclusion of this study is that, investors who were long in past winners and short in past 
losers would consistently achieve above market return for the period of 1990 to 2000. These findings are consistent 
with results of a previous study conducted by Foerster, Prihar and Schmitz (1995) for the period 1977-1992.  The 
momentum effect seems to be a characteristic of the Canadian market which is evidence of price continuation in this 
market.  The robustness of the price continuation hypothesis within this market and the information content of trading 
volumes could be related to the nature and the importance of this market as compared to the U.S. market.   
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